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ADMISSIBILITY IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS OF PROOF OF
OTHER OFFENSES AS SUBSTANTIVE EVIDENCE
"The general rule has been well established that on prosecution for a
particular crime evidence which in any manner shows or tends to show
that the accused has committed another crime wholly independent of that
for which he is on trial, even though it be a crime of the same character,
is irrelevant and inadmissible." 1 This statement by the Tennessee court
announces the basic rule regarding the matter of proof of other crimes as
substantive evidence-a rule which is quoted and adhered to in virtually
every American jurisdiction. 2 The evidence is not excluded because it has
no probative value, but because its probative value is far outweighed by its
prejudicial effect. The fact that a person has committed another crime clearly,
under many circumstances, makes it more probable that he has committed the
crime charged, but it is equally obvious that the natural and inevitable
tendency of the judge and jury would be to give excessive weight to the
accused's criminal record. The jurors would very naturally believe that a
person is guilty of the crime charged if it is proved to their satisfaction
that he has committed a similar offense, or any offense of an equally serious
character. To guard against this evil the courts have unanimously adopted
the general rule of exclusion stated above..
To this general rule, however, there are many equally well settled
exceptions. 3 In fact, the scope of these exceptions is so broad as to have
prompted the remark that "it is difficult to determine which is the more
extensive, the doctrine or the acknowledged exceptions." 4 It is the purpose
of this Note to consider these exceptions individually, with emphasis upon
the law of Tennessee in this regard.
MOTIVE

Motive has been defined as "an inducement, or that which leads or
tempts the mind to indulge the criminal act." 5 It is always proper for the
prosecution to offer evidence of the motive for the commission of the crime
1. Mays v. State, 145 Tenn. 118, 140, 238 S.W. 1096, 1102 (1921).
2. UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 180 (4th ed. 1935); 1 WHARTON,

CRIMINAL

§ 343 (11th ed. 1935).
3. See generally the excellent discussion in People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E.
286 (1901).
4. Trogdon v. Commonwealth, 31 Grat. 862, 870 (Va. 1878). The general rule,
together with its exceptions, is usually treated as a part of the common law of the
particular jurisdiction. Michizan and Ohio apuear to be the only states which have
incorporated the rule and its exceptions into statutes. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1050
(Henderson 1938) ; OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. § 13444-19 (1938), discussed in 5 OHIO ST. L.J.
232 (1939) ; and see LA. CODE CRInm. LAw & PRoc. ANN. Arts. 445, 446 (1943) (applying
only to intent and knowledge).
5.- People v. Fitzgerald, 156 N.Y. 253, 50 N.E. 846, 847 (1898).
779
EVIDENCE

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW,

[ VOL. 3

charged, and this is true even though the evidence tends to show the commission of another crime by the defendant. 6 An example of the application
of this exception is found in the case of Banks v. State.7 The defendant in
that case was indicted for murder. A witness was allowed to testify that
she and the deceased were seated in the woods, that defendant came upon
them, shot the deceased, and then forced her to have sexual intercourse with
him. The Arkansas court properly allowed the introduction of evidence of
the subsequent crime for the purpose of proving defendant's motive for the
murder for which he was then on trial.
A recent Tennessee case s reached a similar result. There defendant was
on trial for procuring the burning of a house. The state was allowed to
prove that defendant carried insurance on the house in an amount greater
than the value of the property destroyed. Defendant objected to this evidence
on the ground that it tended to show him guilty of a separate and distinct
felony-procuring the burning of property insured against loss by fire, with
intent to defraud the insurer.9 The court held that the evidence was admissible to show motive, and expressly overruled Roberts v. State 10 insofar as
that case held to the contrary. The Tennessee court had previously stated
by way of dictum that "evidence is also admissible to show motive prompting the commission of the crime charged by the accused, and is admissible
notwithstanding it also shows the commission by the accused of another
crime of a similar character." 1-1In regard to the phrase "of a similar character" in the quoted material, that factor is clearly not a prerequisite where
the evidence is introduced to show motive. The case of Banks v. State
definitely negates any such requirement.
INTENT

"Intent" is the purpose to use a particular means to effect the result
and accomplish the objective, whereas "motive" is the reason that moves
the will and tempts the mind to indulge the criminal intent.' 2 Testimony as
to other similar offenses is admissible to show intent where there is or may
be, from the evidence, an inference of mistake, accident, lawful purpose
or innocent intent. Also, where an act is equivocal in its nature and may be
6. Mays v. State, 145 Tenn. 118, 141, 238 S.W. 1096, 1103 (1921); Davis v. State,

213 Ala. 541, 105 So. 677 (1925); Banks v. State, 187 Ark. 962, 63 S.W.2d 518 (1933) ;
People v. Peete, 28 Cal. 2d 306, 169 P.2d 924 (1946) ; Ellison v. Commonwealth, 225
S.W.2d 470 (Ky. 1949); 1 WHiARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCF § 351 (11th ed. 1935); 35
CALIF. L. REv. 131, 134 (1947).
7. 187 Ark. 962, 63 S.W.2d 518 (1933).
8. Stanley v: State, 180 Tenn. 70, 171 S.W.2d 406 (1943).
9. TENN. CODE ANN. § 10901 (Williams 1934).
10. 47 Tenn. 359 (1870).
11. Mays v. State, 145 Tenn. 118, 141, 238 S.W. 1096, 1103 (1921).
12. Jones v. State, 13 Ala. App. 10, 68 So. 690, 694 (1915).
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criminal or honest according to the intent with which it is done, other
criminal acts of defendant may be shown, provided that they are offenses
of a shiilar character.13 Since in the usual case where evidence of another
crime is introduced to show intent the underlying purpose is to establish
the absence of accident or inadvertence, it is necessary that the other acts
shown should be similar to the crime charged. A clear example of this type
of situation is found in the Tennessee case of Rafferty v. State.14 Defendant
was on trial for an attempt to obtain money under false pretenses. He had
insured against loss by fire certain chattels which were represented to be
located in a certain building in Memphis. Seventeen days later the building
burned, and defendant sued to collect on the policy. The insured articles
were later found intact in defendant's possession. The state offered in
evidence the fact that on thirteen different occasions defendant had had
fires and collected insurance on these identical chattels. The supreme court
approved the admission of this evidence to establish unlawful intent to defraud.
It should not be assumed that evidence of another similar offense is
always adnissible to prove intent--i.e., that the mere fact of defendant's
having committed another similar crime automatically makes evidence of
that crime admissible. In order for it to be admissible, intent must be an
issue in the case and, in addition, the evidence of the similar act must be
calculated to throw some light on defendant's intent. 15 Also there is another
restriction on the admissibility of evidence of other similar offenses in this
regard: "Where the intent ...

is a necessary conclusion from the act done,

proof of other offenses of a similar character is inadmissible." 16 And in
regard to the question as to whether a transaction is sufficiently similar in
character to be admissible on the issue of intent, it has been stated that
that is a matter in which the trial judge should be allowed a wide range of
17
discretion.
13. "Acts similar to those charged in the indictment can be proved to show intent
when they are sufficiently near and so related in kind as to fairly throw light on the
question of intent and are closely related and of the same general nature as the transactions
out of which the alleged criminal act arose." Schmeller v. United States, 143 F.2d 544,
551 (6th Cir. 1944).
14. 91 Tenn. 655, 16 S.W. 728 (1891) ; accord, Thompson v. State, 171 Tenn. 156, 101
S.W.2d 467 (1937) ; Dobson v. State, 73 Tenn. 271 (1880) ; Defrese v. State, 50 Tenn. 53,
8 Am. Rep. 1 (1870).
15. "[T]he fact that intent is in issue is not enough to let in evidence of similar acts,
unless they are 'so connected with the offense charged in point of time and circumstances
as to throw light upon the intent."' Boyer v. United States, 132 F.2d 12, 13 (D.C. Cir.
1942) ; see State v. Baugh, 200 Iowa 1225, 206 N.W. 250, 251 (1925).
16. People v. Lonsdale, 122 Mich. 388, 81 N.W. 277, 278 (1899); accord, State v.
Barker, 249 S.W. 75 (Mo. 1923); People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286, 296
(1901). "It is well settled that where an offense is of such a nature that proof of the act
with which the defendant is charged is not in itself proof of the required criminal intent
and where additional proof of such intent is necessary to prove the crime charged, evidence
of other offenses of a similar nature committed by the defendant is admissible for the
purpose of proving intent." People v. Coltrin, 5 Cal.2d 649, 55 P.2d 1161, 1164 (1936).
17. United States v. Feldman, 136 F.2d 394, 399 (Zd Cir. 1943), aft'd, 322 U.S. 487,
64 Sup. Ct. 1082, 88 L. Ed. 1408 (1944).
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IDENTITY

Another exception to the general rule involves the question of identity.
In Mays v. State 18 the Tennessee court stated by way of dictum that "it
has been said that evidence of other crimes committed by the accused is
relevant to prove his identity; but it is more correct to say that, where
the commission of a crime is proven, evidence to identify the accused as the
person who committed it is not to be excluded solely because it proves or
tends to prove that he was guilty of another and independent crime." 10 A
typical example of the situation where such evidence is admitted to prove
identity is the Tennessee case of Warren v. State.20 Defendant was convicted of the crime of robbery. The victims of this robbery were parked on
a road at night. Their car was approached by a person who had an impediment in his speech; he carried a flashlight in one hand and a pistol in the
other, and had black grease smeared over his face. The lower court admitted
testimony of W to the effect that a few nights later, at about the same locality
and about the same time of night, his car was held up and he was robbed
by a man carrying a pistol in one hand and a flashlight in the other, whose
face was smeared with dark grease, and who had an impediment in his
speech. On appeal the supreme court held that this evidence was properly
admitted to prove defendant's identity as the perpetrator of the crime charged,
particularly since defendant's guilt was denied and an alibi insisted upon.
In a very recent Tennessee case 21 this same point arose, and a similar
result was reached. The three defendants were indicted for the rape of
Miss A on Capitol Hill in Nashville. Evidence was introduced that the
three defendants had encountered Miss A, Miss B, and a young man named
Morris, and at gun point had robbed them of their money and jewelry;
that defendant Scribner had held Morris off while the other two defendants
raped Miss A; that defendant Scribner had then raped Miss B. Defendant
Scribner objected to the admission of evidence of the rape of Miss B and
robbery of the trio. The Tennessee Supreme Court, in affirming the conviction, stated that "the identification of the defendants was definitely put in
issue on defendants' plea of an alibi, and the evidence of the assault on
Miss "B" and of the robbery being relevant on the question of identification
was not rendered inadmissible by the fact that incidentally it tended to prove
a separate crime." 22
In the last illustrative case noted above, the other crime was a part of
the same transaction and probably would have also been admissible as part
18.
19.
20.
(Minn.
21.
22.

145 Tenn. 118, 238 S.W. 1096 (1921).
Id. at 141, 238 S.W. at 1102.

178 Tenn. 157, 156 S.W.2d 416 (1941) ; accord, State v. Bock, 39 N.W.2d 887

1949) ; Brown v. State, 171 Miss. 157, 157 So. 363 (1934), 7 Miss. L.J. 432 (1935).
Turner v. State, 187 Tenn. 309, 213 S.W.2d 261 (1948).
Id. at 317, 213 S.W.2d at 284. See Note, 63 A.L.R. 602 (1929).
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of the res gestae. In many other cases, however, in which evidence of other
offenses was admitted to prove identity the second offense constituted a
separate and distinct crime in no way connected with the offense charged.
So long as the proof of the other crime is relevant on the question of identity
it is wholly immaterial whether it is part of the same transaction or entirely
separate from the crime for which the defendant is on trial.23
The general view is that evidence of another crime is not admissible
for the purpose of proving identity where the identity of the accused is not
in issue. 24 The rule has been stated by the Tennessee Supreme Court to be

as follows:
"The admission of such evidence should at all times be carefully guarded and restricted

to cases in which its introduction is called for to establish more clearly the identity
of the accused. If identity has been otherwise clearly made out, such evidence should

not be introduced, since in such case it could have no other effect than to prejudice
the defendant by establishing his guilt of an independent crime, and we do not intend
to recognize or approve the admission of such evidence when this is its purpose and only

effect."

"

DESIGN OR PLAN

A fourth exception to the general rule of exclusion allows the admission of evidence of prior crimes to show design or plan. This design or
plan is not an element of the crime charged but is the preceding mental
condition which evidentially points to the doing of the act planned. Li case!
of intent the doing of the act by the defendant is conceded and the only
object is to negative innocent intent; whereas in cases involving design the
object is to show that since defendant planned to do the act the chances
26
are very great that he actually did it.
- In -the Tennessee case of Caldwell v.State 27 where the defendant had
been indicted for a fraudulent breach of trust it was necessary for the
state to prove that Caldwell, as Piesident of the Bank of Tennessee, was
criminally responsible for acts done in the name of the corporation by virtue
of his directing the appropriation or knowingly permitting it to be done.
The court stated that evidence of subsequent acts of the same nature would
23. B.9., Johnson v. -State, 242 Ala. 278, 5 So.2d 632 (1941) ; Thomas v. State, 132
Fla. 78, 181 So. 337 (1937) ; Cooper v. State, 182 Ga. 42, 184 S.E. 716 (1936) ; New v.

State, 68 Ga. App. 86, 22 S.E.2d 192 (1942) ; Schwartz v. State, 194 Miss. 315, 12 So.2d
157 (1943) ; State v. Biggs, 224 N.C. 722, 32 S.E.2d 352 (1944). But cf. Harris v. State,
227 S.W.2d 8 (Tenn. 1950) (evidence of prior rape by defendant of witness held inadmissible in prosecution for rape on ground that the two crimes were not so similar in their
circumstances as to warrant the reception of proof of one as relevant to prove the other).
24. Warren v. State, 178 Tenn. 157, 156 S.W.2d 416 (1941); Johnson -v. State, 242

Ala. 278, 5 So.2d 632 (1942) ; People v. Filas, 369 I1. 78, 15 N.E.2d 718 (1938) ; Kirby
v. Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 535, 267 S.W. 1094 (1925); 20 Am. JTRa., Evidence § 312
(1939).
25. Warren v. State, 178 Tenn. 157, 164, 156 S.W.2d 416, 419 (1941).
26. 2 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 300, 304 (3d ed. 1940).
27. 164 Tenn. 325, 48 S.W.2d 1087 (1932).
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be admissible upon the issue of whether or not the specific breach charged
was committed pursuant to a general plan or scheme fraudulently to appro28
priate bonds procured under trust agreements.
KNOWLEDGE

In many prosecutions, such as those for the uttering of forged or
counterfeit paper and the receiving of stolen property, guilty knowledge is
the gist of the offense to be established, and evidence of other criminal acts
is admissible to establish that knowledge. 29 This exception seems to have
been applied by the Tennessee court in cases involving six different offenses-uttering counterfeit coins, receiving stolen property, forgery, uttering forged
30
bills, larceny and fraudulently making false entries in books.
The earliest reported Tennessee case involving this exception is Peek
v. State.31 Defendant was indicted for passing counterfeit money. Over
objection the state was allowed to introduce testimony to the effect that
defendant had subsequently passed counterfeit coins to the witness, but had
taken them back upon demand after the witness had become suspicious.
The supreme court held the evidence to have been properly admitted. "There
is no doubt but that evidence that other counterfeit money was passed by
the prisoner, at other times, either before or after the offense for which he
was indicted, is admissible, to show his guilty knowledge in the particular
case." 32
In the recent case of Patterson v. State 33 this exception was again
recognized. In a prosecution for receiving stolen property the state was
allowed to introduce proof that defendant had purchased the goods without
a ration certificate; this act was a crime punishable under federal law. Since
defendant maintained that he had no knowledge that the goods were stofen,
as is usually the defense in such a prosecution, evidence regarding the ration
certificate was clearly material and relevant as tending to show guilty knowledge, since an offer to sell without a certificate would operate to put an
innocent buyer on notice that the goods were probably stolen.
28. Id. at 341, 48 S.W.2d at 1092; accord, Singer v. State, 195 Ark. 345, 112 S.W.2d
426 (1938) ; People v. Dunn, 40 Cal. App. 2d 6, 104 P.2d 119 (1940) ; Sawyer v. State, 73
Okla. Crim. App. 186, 119 P.2d 256 (1941) ; State v. Smith, 117 W.Va. 598, 186 S.E. 621
(1936).
29. United States v. Fawcett, 115 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1940); People v. Lima, 25
Cal. 2d 573, 154 P.2d 698"(1944); Ball v. Commonwealth, 278 Ky. 52, 128 S.W.2d 176
(1939); 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 349 (11th ed. 1935); See Notes, 68 A.L.R.
187 (1930), 105 A.L.R. 1288 (1936).
30. Patterson v. State, 184 Tenn. 39, 195 S.W.2d 26 (1946) ; Dickson v. State, 166
Tenn. 300, 61 S.V.2d 661 (1933) ; Foute v. State, 83 Tenn. 712 (1885) ; Links v. State, 81
Tenn. 701 (1884); Garner v. State, 73 Tenn. 213 (1880); Peek v. State, 21 Tenn. 78
(1840).
31. 21 Tenn. 78 (1840).
32. Id. at 86.
33. 184 Tenn. 39, 195 S.W.2d 26 (1946).
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As mentioned above, the Tennessee court has also admitted evidence
of other crimes for the purpose of proving knowledge in prosecutions for
fraudulently making false entries in books and for larceny. It is very doubtful,
however, that the latter case represents a correct application of this exception. In that case 34 the property alleged to have been stolen was a ring
belonging to Wiggers, a jeweler in Nashville. Defendant had come into the
store and asked to be shown a ring. A tray of rings was placed before her.
The store later discovered that an expensive ring had been removed from
the tray and an inexpensive ring inserted in its stead. The state was then
allowed to introduce the testimony of Allen to the effect that on the same
day defendant had come into his store and taken a diamond ring in substantially the same manner. The supreme court held that this evidence was
admissible to show guilty knowledge. But exactly what "knowledge" is the
court referring to? The defense was not that the defendant picked the ring
up by mistake or even that defendant thought the ring belonged to her, but
rather that the defendant had never been in Nashville and knew nothing at
all about the transaction. In other words the basic question was one of
identity, and not of guilty knowledge. The evidence of the subsequent crime
was clearly admissible, either to prove identity or to show design or plan,
but it seems equally clear that it was not admissible to prove knowledge.
In a more recent case,35 involving a prosecution for fraudulently making
false entries, the court admitted evidence of similar manipulations of accounts
of other customers. No evidence was offered by defendant in his own behalf.
On appeal the supreme court held the evidence to have been properly admitted "as tending directly to charge [defendant] with knowledge of the
entry in question, and with joint intent thereby to defraud the bank." 86
These prior manipulations appear to have been properly admitted in view
of the fact that the circumstances surrounding them were such as to show
that defendant had knowledge of their falsity. However it is essential, in
cases where the commission of other similar acts is put in evidence to prove
knowledge, that the other acts should be of such a nature as fairly to charge
the person involved with guilty knowledge of their character.
REs

GESTAE

"When a collateral offense, or, as it is sometimes called, an extraneous
crime, forms part of the res gestae, evidence of it is admissible." m' This
statement, or its equivalent, is frequently found in the cases and treatises
on criminal evidence. And by virtue of this exception evidence of many
34.
35.
36.
37.

Links v. State, 81 Tenn. 701 (1884).
Dickson v. State, 166 Tenn. 300, 61 S.W.2d 661 (1933).
Id. at 306, 61 S.W.2d at 663.
1 WHARNO, CMINAL EviDENCE 496 (11th ed. 1935).
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prior and subsequent crimes is admitted, seemingly without regard, in a
great number of cases at least, to the question of whether its prejudicial
effect will not greatly outweigh its probative value.38 That this is so is not
surprising when one considers the nebulous character of the "res gestae"
concept. The true meaning of the term, however, as applied to the particular
evidentiary problem under discussion, would seem to be that when the
proof of an extraneous crime is so interwoven as to be inseparable from the
crime for which defendant is being tried, so that the evidence of the two
acts cannot be separated, then the evidence of the other crime is clearly
admissible as part of the res gestae. As thus interpreted this exception
is entirely logical and is in accord with the statement of the Tennessee court
that evidence "material to the issue under investigation in a criminal case
is never rendered incompetent because it tends to show that the accused has
committed other crimes." 39
The Tennessee court appears to have relied on this exception as the basis
40
for its holding in only two cases.
To

REBUT A SPECIAL DEFENSE

In many criminal cases the defendant seeks to avoid conviction by interposing a special or affirmative defense. Under such circumstances the state
is allowed to rebut this- defense, even though the evidence offered will tend
to show the commission of a prior or subsequent crime by the defendant.
This is in accord with the oft-repeated statement that this general rule of
exclusion "does not apply where the evidence of another crime tends directly
to prove defendant's guilt of the crime charged." 41
In Rowe v. State 42 defendant was indicted on a charge of obtaining
money under false pretenses in violation of a special statute. The defense
was that the fraudulent representations were not such as were calculated
to deceive a man of ordinary prudence and caution, and that unless they were
of such a character they would not justify a prosecution under the statute.
The state was permitted to introduce proof of similar transactions between
the defendant and other individuals, whereby defendant obtained money
upon the faith of similar representations, on the theory that this proof
directly reflected on the care and prudence exercised by the prosecuting
witness.

38. See cases cited in 1 WHARTON. CRIMINAL EViDENCE § 347, n.20 (11th ed. 1935).
39. Woodruff v. State, 164 Tenn. 530, 539, 51 S.W.2d 843, 845 (1932).
40. Links v. State, 81 Tenn. 701 (1884) ; Sartin v. State, 75 Tenn. 679 (1881) ; see
Wrather v. State, 179 Tenn. 666, 675, 169 S.W.2d 854, 857 (1943); Mays v. State, 145
Tenn. 118, 141, 238 S.W. 1096, 1102 (1921).
41. Mays v. State,'145 Tenn. 118, 140, 238 S.W. 1096, 1102 (1921).
42. 164 Tenn. 571, 51 S.W2d 505 (1932).
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In other jurisdictions this exception has been resorted to in order to
45
44
rebut defenses of insanity, 43 justifiable homicide, and physical inability.
SEXUAL CRIMES

In cases involving sexual offenses, such as adultery, fornication, seduction, rape and incest, the courts have been much more liberal in permitting
the admissioh in evidence of other criminal acts of a sexual nature, and
for that reason it is desirable, in any discussion of the admissibility of
evidence of other offenses as substantive proof in a criminal trial, to place
cases involving sexual offenses in a separate category. While the courts
have been liberal in admitting such evidence in sexual cases, it does not follow
that evidence tending to prove another offense by the defendant is regarded
as admissible when it plainly will not aid in proving defendant guilty of the
offense charged. The liberality arises from the general feeling that the
mere fact of the commission of a similar offense has more probative value
in proving the commission of the offense charged in cases involving sexual
crimes than it does in cases involving any other type of crime. For example,
evidence of similar sexual offenses has frequently been admitted solely to
show inclination or lustful disposition.4 6 While the character of the offense
charged is of importance in determining the question of its admissibility,
"of greater importance, generally, are questions as to whether the offered
proof related to an offense occuring prior or subsequent to the offense
charged, whether the offered proof related to an offense in which the prosecutrix was involved, and whether the related offense was of the same character as the offense charged." 47
The clear Tennessee holdings in this particular category seem to have
43. People v. Lane, 101 Cal. 513, 36 Pac. 16 (1894)

(prosecution for murder;

previous incest of defendant with his daughter admissible to rebut defense of insanity
induced through fear that deceased would debaich daughter); Hall v. State, 31 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 565, 21 S.W. 368 (1893).
44. People v. Morales, 143 Cal. 550, 77 Pac. 470 (1904) (previous escape by defendant
from deceased police officer admissible to rebut defense defendant did not know deceased
was police officer).
45. Snead v. State, 243 Ala. 23, 8 So.2d 269 (1942).
46. E.g., People v. Troutman, 187 Cal. 313, 201 Pac. 928 (1921); People v. Hall, 25
Cal. App. 2d 336, 77 P.2d 244 (1938) ; McMichen v. State, 62 Ga. App. 50, 7 S.E.2d 749
(1940) ; Tuttle v. Commonwealth, 287 Ky. 371, 153 S.W.2d 931 (1941) ; 30 Ky. L.J. 433
(1942); Williams v. Commonwealth, 277 Ky. 227, 126 S.W.2d 131 (1939); State v.
Cupit, 189 La. 509, 179 So. 837 (1938); State v. Elijah, 206 Minn. 619, 289 N.W. 575
(1940). Contra: Harris v. State, 227 S.W.2d 8 (Tenn. 1950).
"[I]t is the weight of authority in other states that evidence of other offenses of a
similar nature committed by the accused on the same alleged victim are admissible in
the trial of sexual offenses, if not too far remote, for corroboration purposes and to show
the lustful disposition of the accused.... I have no doubt that but for the abhorrence and
deep-rooted contempt with which all sex crimes are viewed this additional exception to
the general rule would never have found its way into the jurisprudence of the courts
of the land." State v. Ferrand, 210 La. 394, 27 So.2d 174, 179 (1946) (dissenting
opinion), noted in 25 TEXAS L. Rav. 421 (1947).
47. Note, 167 A.L.R. 565, 569 (1947).
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been confined to two types of offenses, assault with intent to commit rape
and violation of the age-of-consent law. In Williams v. State,48 a prosecution
for assault with intent to rape, the state was allowed to introduce into evidence
-proof of other violent attempts on the person of the prosecutrix previous
to that charged. The supreme court affirmed the conviction, stating that
such evidence has direct relevancy to the question of intent. In the leading
case of Sykes v. State 49 defendant was indicted for statutory rape. The state
was allowed, over objection, to introduce testimony tending to show other acts
of intercourse between the parties, such other acts occurring both prior and
subsequent to the act in question. On appeal the supreme court affirmed
the conviction, stating that "in a case like the one before us other acts of
intercourse do illustrate and tend to prove the commission of the particular
act of intercourse which the State has elected to try the prisoner on, because
they show the relations-the state of intimacy-existing between the prisoner
and the girl and tend to make very probable the commission of the crime
charged." 50
DEGREE OF PROOF

In introducing evidence of another crime the prosecution is not required
to prove the elements of the asserted crime beyond all reasonable doubt.
It is only the ultimate material facts to which the rule of reasonable doubt
applies.
"[T]he state need not establish each particular fact of the case beyond a reasonable
doubt, if it establishes beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of every material fact
alleged in the indictment and the guilt of the defendant.... If testimony with regard to
other similar crimes is to be dealt with as other evidence, it falls under this general rule
and need not be discarded simply because particular items tending to prove other
similar offenses are not established beyond 'a reasonable doubt, so long as the jury,
from the whole testimony, are convinced to a moral certainty of the guilt of the
defendant of the crime charged and of the existence of every material element necessary
to establish that guilt." "

The Tennessee court has stated its position on this point as follows:
"Without going so far as to hold, with some of the Courts, that the proof
of the independent crime must be 'beyond a reasonable doubt,' we approve
the. rule that, to render evidence of an independent crime admissible, the
48. 27 Tenn. 585 (1848) ; cf. McKenzie v. State, 250 Ala. 178, 33 So.2d 488 (1947),
39 J.CR m. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 485 (1948).
49. 112 Tenn. 572, 82 S.W. 185 (1903).
50. Id. at 576, 82 S.W. at 185. For an exhaustive treatment of the problem of
admissibility of other similar offenses in prosecution for sexual offenses see Note, 167
A.L.R. 565 (1947).
51. Scott v. State, 107 Ohio St. 475, 141 N.E. 19, 26 (1923), overruling Baxter v.
State, 91 Ohio St. 167, 110 N.E. 456 (1914) ; accord, People v. Lisenba, 14 Cal. 2d 403,
94 P.2d 569 (1939), 13 So. CALIF. L. REv. 511 (1940); 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
§ 360 (11th ed. 1935).
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proof of its commission, and of the connection of the accused on trial therewith, must be not 'vague and uncertain,' but clear and convincing." 52
In regard to the length of time over which an inquiry as to other crimes
may extend, the general view seems to be that it is a matter entirely within
the discretion of the trial court.5 3
CONCLUSION
The law on the subject of admissibility of evidence of other offenses
has developed in the form of a general rule excluding evidence of other
crimes with numerous specifically designated exceptions thereto.5 4 As so
developed it has resulted in inescapable confusion among the cases and an
understandable uncertainty among lawyers and judges. As a result of this
uncertainty the proffered evidence is generally excluded or admitted, not
as a result of weighing relevancy against prejudice, but solely on the basis
of mechanical reasoning--i.e., can it be fitted into one of the well settled
exceptions? And even that question all too often fails to receive any merited
consideration. Consider, for example, the case of Holmes v. Comntonwealth,55
in which the court enumerated seven exceptions, and concluded: "Clearly
the evidence complained of comes within one or more of the enumerated

exceptions." 56
In an attempt to bring order out of chaos the suggestion has been
advanced that the rule regarding this evidence should be stated affirmatively
rather than as a rule of exclusion.5 7 The proposed rule is to the effect that'
all evidence of other criminal acts of defendant is admissible whenever
relevant to any material issue raised upon his trial for a specific crime,
except when such evidence is relevant only as showing the defendant's
disposition to do criminal acts. The adoption of this suggested view, in
addition to simplifying the law of evidence on this point would accomplish
two important objectives: (1) it would enable courts to admit relevant
evidence in a jurisdiction which has not recognized a particular exception
to the general rule of exclusion under which the offered evidence could be

52. Wrather v. State, 179 Tenn. 666, 678, 169 S.W.2d 854, 858 (1943) ; accord, Weiss
v. United States, 122 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1941) ; State v. Porter, 229 Iowa 882, 294 N.W.
898 (1941) ; State v. Patterson, 347 Mo. 802, 149 S.W.2d 332 (1941).
53. E.g., Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1941) ; State v. Semmens,
105 Mont. 113, 71 P.2d 913 (1937) ; People v. Rutmer, 260 App. Div. 784, 24 N.Y.S.2d
334 (2d Dep't 1940) ; State v. Lewis, 57 S.E.2d 513 (W.Va. 1949).
54. It should be noted that these categories are not mutually exclusive. In some
cases evidence of another crime will be admitted for but a single purpose, while in other
cases it may be admitted for several purposes.
55. 241 Ky. 573, 44 S.W.2d 592 (1931).
56. 44 S.W.2d at 598.
57. Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46 HARv. L.
REv. 954 (1933) ; Stone, The Ride of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51
HARv. L. Rav. 988 (1938).
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classified; and (2) it would focus the attention of the courts upon the real
point in issue, the relevancy of the offered evidence to a material issue
and the particular nature and force of that relevancy.5 8
CLINTON

J.

MORGAN

58. For a discussion of the admissibility of evidence of prior crimes in murder trials

see Note, 25 IND. L.J. 64 (1949).

